Abstract This paper aims to clarify the connection between the logic of temporal distinctions and the temporal features of propositions. Contra Prior, it argues that the adoption of tense operators does not commit one to the view that propositions can change their truth value over time.
Introduction
There are two ways of incorporating temporal distinctions into a system of logic. Tensed theories expand our logical framework with sentential tense operators like 'P' ("it was the case that") and 'F' ("it will be the case that") that function in a similar manner as the modal operator '♦' ("possibly"). While prefixing '♦' to a sentence causes it to be evaluated at other possible worlds, prefixing 'P' or 'F' causes it to be evaluated at past or future times. Tenseless theories, on the other hand, propose to treat temporal distinctions like spatial distinctions. Rather than introduce new logical constants, tenseless theories try to make do with the resources of standard logic. In place of tense operators, they use explicit quantification over suitable temporal entities, such as metaphysically basic time points, or the temporal parts of material objects.
The question I want to discuss in this short paper is whether adopting a tensed theory of temporal distinctions has repercussions for our theory of propositions. Up to the early twentieth century, it was of course quite common to identify propositions with a particular class of indicative sentences (Prior 1976, chap. 1) . In that case, propositions would directly inherit the temporal features of sentences for the simple reason that propositions are sentences. What I have in mind here, though, is the now standard view that propositions are expressed by sentences, but are not themselves sentences. On this view, the relation between sentences and propositions is not as straightforward.
Following Richard (1981) , say that a proposition is eternal if it always has the same truth value, and temporal if it is true at some times and false at others. I take it that anybody who accepts propositions -and some philosophers don't -will also accept eternal propositions. An eternal proposition is just like a temporal proposition, except that it changes its truth value very, very rarely. The main issue is whether to accept temporal propositions, which would include eternal propositions as a limiting case. Let me therefore use 'temporalism' for the thesis that some propositions are temporal, and 'eternalism' for the claim that all propositions are eternal.
Eternalism is a "spatial" view of propositions. Aside from a few dissenters, such Rescher and Garson (1968) and Wright (1979) , everybody believes that propositions do not take different truth values at different places. Eternalism claims that the temporal dimension of propositions is just like that, and that the truth values of propositions do not vary across time, either. Temporalism, by contrast, is a "modal" theory of propositions. Contingent propositions are true in some possible worlds and false in others, just as temporal propositions take different truth values at different times. The limiting cases of necessary and impossible propositions, which take the same truth value in every world, are modal counterparts of eternal propositions.
Even if propositions are not sentences, but are only expressed by them, it still seems natural to suppose that the differences must match the distinctions, and that the adoption of a tensed theory commits us to temporalism. The assumption of such a connection can be found throughout the work of Prior (1957 Prior ( , 1967 Prior ( , 1968 , and in much of the literature on the philosophy of time. For example, it plays a central role in Brogaard's recent book (2012) , which aims to revive Prior's temporalism. My aim here is to lay out a case against this popular assumption, and to argue that there is no interesting connection between tensed theories and temporalism. What we say about the temporal features of propositions is largely independent of the choice between tensed and tenseless theories.
Linguistic theories
One complication is that tense logic has been put to a number of different uses. As far as applications of philosophical interest are concerned, the main applications of tense logic are as a linguistic theory of verb tense and as a metaphysical theory of the nature of time. (Pnueli 1977 discusses the use of tense logic in computer science, which I will not consider here.) On the other side of the issue, propositions have been claimed to play a number of different roles: as contents of assertion, as the objects of belief and other attitudes, and as the kinds of things that pick out facts. It is far from obvious that all these different roles require propositions to have the same temporal features, or that they all matter equally to the various employments of tense logic. What we say about the relation between tensed theories and temporal propositions depends on what we want to do with either of them separately, and there are various combinations one could consider.
Let me begin with the main application of tense logic that Prior himself had in mind, which is the use of tense logic as a linguistic theory of verb tense in English:
[P]utting a verb into the past or future tense is exactly the same sort of thing as adding an adverb to the sentence. 'I was having my breakfast' is related to 'I am having my breakfast' in exactly the same way as 'I am allegedly having my breakfast' is related to it, and it is only an historical accident that we generally form the past tense by modifying the present tense, e.g. by changing 'am' to 'was', rather than by tacking on an adverb. In a rationalized language with uniform constructions for similar functions we could form the past tense by prefixing to a given sentence the phrase 'It was the case that' […] and the future tense by prefixing 'It will be the case that' (Prior 1968, pp. 7-8 ).
If we combine this adverbial theory of verb tense with Montague's (1974) theory that adverbs function as sentential operators-rather than as predicates of events, as Davidson (1980) claims-then it follows that verb tenses function like sentential tense operators. Indeed, it is because of this alleged connection with verb tense that the formal study of operators like 'P' or 'F' came to be known as tense logic in the first place. (Rescher and Urquhart (1971) prefer 'temporal logic').
Before turning to temporal propositions, it must be noted that this "modal" theory of verb tense has been largely abandoned by linguists. The reason is that verb tenses in natural languages do not seem to function like sentential operators. One issue is that sequences of tenses in English often do not iterate like tense operators. Enç (1987, p. 635) gives the example "John heard that Mary was pregnant", which contains two verbs in the past tense. If Prior were right then this sentences should have the form "P (John hears that P (Mary is pregnant))", and thus assert that, at some time in the past, John heard that Mary was pregnant at an even earlier time, prior to the hearing. This seems infelicitous. A more natural reading takes the sentence to assert that John heard that Mary was pregnant at the time of the hearing. If that is right, then the sequence of tenses does not effect a successive shift in time, as Prior's account would predict. (For more examples of this type, see Ogihara 1996) .
A second issue, noted by Kamp and Reyle (1993, chap. 5) , is that verb tense often serves as a vehicle for establishing intersentential connections between the various components of a text, rather than shift the time of evaluation of a single sentence, as tense operators do. For instance, in a sequence of past tense sentences, the order of the sentences can indicate the order in which the events described have unfolded in the past. Here is a simple example: "John put a cartridge in the breech. He closed the bolt. When he heard the command, he pulled the trigger". If we shift one of the sentences to a different position, we get a description of a different course of events. We might go from a description of a successful firing to a description of an inept handling of a firearm. The same tensed sentence can therefore make different contributions if placed within different texts, or at different positions within the same text.
One could easily imagine a language that uses tense operators like 'P' or 'F' to make temporal distinctions, but this does not appear to be the function of verb tense in English. The issue is not one of expressive power. Given a suitably strong tense logic, every claim about time can be expressed in terms of sentential tense operators (Cresswell 1990; Meyer 2009 ). The problem is rather that-contrary to what Prior claims-putting a verb into a tense is not the same as prefixing a tense operator. As James Higginbotham sums up the majority view, "the modal theory of tenses is inadequate: there is no basic part of our language for which it is correct" (1999, p. 199) . (For a dissenting view, see Brogaard 2012.) One might concede that Prior was wrong about the minutiae of verb tense, but insist that he was right about the big picture. There is an important difference between "It will rain tomorrow", which changes its truth value over time, and "It is raining at noon on March 12th, 2014" whose truth value is always the same. The key insight is that English contains sentences that vary in truth value from one time to the next, just as some of its sentences vary in truth value from one possible world to another. For lack of a better word, let us call these temporal counterparts of contingent claims tensed * sentences, and let tenseless * sentences be the temporal counterparts of necessary and impossible sentences. We can let linguists figure out how precisely verb tense helps to generate tensed * sentences, but the main point is that any acceptable linguistic theory of English will contain such tensed * sentences.
The question is whether this tells us anything about the temporal features of propositions. The primary employment of propositions is as the contents of what is being asserted by an utterance of a sentence. One might think that this means that the temporal features of the content must mirror the temporal features of the sentence, but that turns out to be mistaken. There are many utterances of tensed * sentences that do not seem to assert temporal propositions. Suppose that John asserts "I will eat in one hour" at noon and "I will not eat in one hour" after lunch at two o'clock. If the contents being asserted were temporal propositions then what John truly asserts at noon would become false during lunch. John would thus assert the same proposition at noon that he rejects at two o'clock. This account seems far less plausible that the rival proposal that John is asserting two different eternal propositions, namely that he eats at one o'clock and that he does not eat at three o'clock. If that is right then the most plausible account of this fragment of English combines a tensed * linguistic theory with eternalism about propositions.
It might be helpful to compare this with the spatial case. The same sentence "It is hot" can be used to say something true at one place and something false at another. But that alone that does not show that there are "spatial" propositions that change truth value from one place to another. Nor does it entail that we somehow ought to change the meaning of spatial indexicals, or abandon their use altogether, so as to align the sentences of our language with the non-spatial propositions that they express. On the contrary, it seems that we can say something illuminating about the propositions expressed by identifying the different sentences that need to be uttered at different places to express the same proposition. If I say "It is hot here" then you need to say something like "It is hot over there" to express the same content.
The same holds in the temporal case. Say that a class of sentences characterizes propositions if every utterance of a sentence in the class expresses the same proposition, irrespective of its time of utterance. Then tensed * sentences characterize temporal propositions-provided there are such propositions-and tenseless * sentences char-acterize eternal propositions. We would get the alleged link between logical form and propositions if we subscribed to the view that sentences must characterize propositions. But one might well be satisfied with a theory in which the same proposition gets picked out by different sentences at different times-after all, that is what English does. In our example, John would need to utter "I will eat in one hour" at noon and "I ate one hour ago" at two o'clock to express the same proposition in both cases.
One might object that this misunderstands the point of logical analysis. A theory of logical from ought to be a theory of propositions, one might claim, and the task of logical analysis is to map utterances of ordinary language sentences to the sentences of a formal language that characterize whatever propositions happen to exist. Logical analysis aims to identify the "deep" logical form of sentences that lurk below their syntactic surface structure. However, a logical analysis of this type is really a search for a theory of propositions, not a search for a linguistic theory. Any theory of propositions surely needs an appropriate way of talking about them. If we had independent reasons for endorsing temporalism then it would be very natural to adopt a tensed * language that has sentences that characterize these temporal propositions. Indeed, we might even decide to adopt Prior's P/F tense logic as a theory of such propositions. But that would merely show that temporalism requires a tensed theory, and what is at stake here is the opposite question: whether a tensed theory requires temporal propositions.
Consider a fictional Priorian language that makes temporal distinctions by prefixing tense operators 'P' and 'F' to sentences. A token of Pϕ uttered at time t is true if and only if there is a time earlier than t at which ϕ is true, and an utterance of Fϕ at t is true just in case ϕ is true at a time later than t. This tells us about the contributions that 'P' and 'F' make to the sentences of our language, but it tells us little about what sort of propositions are expressed by utterances of such sentences. Just as English often seems to use tensed * sentences to express eternal propositions, also the sentences of our fictional language could be used to express eternal propositions. In that case, the correct logical analysis would take the form of a tenseless theory of eternal propositions, but the linguistic theory of our language would still be a Priorian tense logic. (Of related interest is Lewis' 1998 argument that the semantic value of a sentence differs from its propositional content).
Up to now, I considered the role of propositions as the contents of assertion. Propositions are also said to form the object of belief, dread, and other attitudes, and it is not at all obvious that these different attitudes must take the same type of proposition as object, or that their objects must coincide with the contents of assertion. For example, it seems perfectly consistent to side with Richard's (1981) claim that the objects of belief are eternal propositions, but then turn around and agree with Prior (1959) that the objects of dread and relief are temporal-even though the objects of these different attitudes might well be expressed by the same tensed * sentences.
At this juncture, one might begin to wonder why we should worry about the mere existence of temporal propositions in the first place. If we regard propositions as abstract objects, as many philosophers do, then there appears to be little point in agonizing over this question. For example, we might identify eternal propositions with functions from possible worlds to truth values and temporal propositions with functions from world-time pairs to truth values. The existence of both types of proposition would then be a trivial consequence of any ontology that contains worlds, times, and elementary set theory. (This includes "ersatz" views that do not accept times and worlds as metaphysically basic, but construct them out of something else). The only remaining question would be which of these abstract objects perform which of the various proposition roles, not whether they exist. There would also be room for views that accept both temporal and eternal propositions, but assign them different roles.
While there are interesting questions about verb tense in ordinary language, and equally interesting questions about the contents of assertion and the objects of attitudes, these are separate issues that need to be settled independently of one another. Whether or not we adopt tense logic as part of a regimentation of any part of natural language tells us very little about the temporal features of propositions.
Metaphysical theories
Instead of presenting it as a linguistic theory of natural language, one could also propose tense logic as a metaphysical theory of the nature of time. In this case, the claim would be that the best theory of the nature of time is one that takes certain tense operators as conceptually primitive. Whereas tenseless theories of time incur ontological commitment to temporal entities, such as metaphysically basic time points or temporal parts, the adoption of tense logic as a metaphysical theory would instead incur ideological commitment to primitive tense operators.
Prior seems to have thought that tense logic could serve both as a linguistic and a metaphysical theory. Even if this were correct, though, it would be at best a fortuitous accident. The temporal structure of natural language arose in response to practical communicative needs that are far removed from the theoretical considerations that metaphysicians of time worry about. It appears perfectly conceivable for the temporal structure of ordinary language to diverge from the structure of time itself. The reasons for rejecting tense logic as a linguistic theory of verb tense therefore do not speak against its use as a metaphysical theory. Conversely, there is no reason why a metaphysical theory of time should concern itself with the contents of assertion, the objects of propositional attitudes, of the tenses of verbs in English.
But there is another use of propositions that does have metaphysical import. This is the role that propositions play in theories of facts. Very roughly, facts are supposed to be entities that correspond to contingently true propositions. Thus the fact that ϕ is identical to the fact that ψ just in case the sentences ϕ and ψ express the same true proposition. The distinction between temporal and eternal propositions would thus project onto a distinction between different types of facts. A tensed fact is one that corresponds to a true temporal proposition, and comes into or goes out of existence as the proposition changes its truth value. Untensed facts correspond to true eternal propositions and never go out of or come into existence. If we regard propositions as abstract objects, such as functions from worlds or world-time pairs to truth values, then both eternal and temporal propositions exist necessarily. In that case, a theory of facts might need to postulate a more restricted notion of proposition that counts only some of these abstract objects as propositions in the narrow metaphysical sense that they serve to pick out the facts. I suggested earlier that one might well be happy with a theory of assertion and attitudes on which the same proposition gets picked out by different sentences at different times. This does not appear to be true for theories of facts. A theory of the nature of time whose sentences always pick out the facts would be far more illuminating of the temporal aspects of reality that one that does not, and ought to be preferred for that reason alone. We want a theory whose sentences characterize the propositions that pick out the facts. If this is right then tensed facts require a tensed theory of the nature of time, and untensed facts a tenseless theory. Conversely, we would only be justified in presenting something as a metaphysical theory of time if we also thought that it succeeds in picking out the facts in this way.
If we think about the metaphysics of time in these terms then the main question is whether the facts are tensed or untensed. As Kit Fine (2005, Sect. 1) notes, though, this is a question to which we are unlikely to get a decisive answer. What sort of facts we get depends on what sort of propositions we postulate. Yet if the main employment of propositions is in accounts of facts, rather than in theories of assertion and attitudes, then we cannot get a non-circular argument for or against tensed facts. Our account of facts depends on our account of propositions, and our account of propositions depends on our account of facts. It would thus be impossible to give an argument in favor or against tensed facts that is not patently begging the question.
However, we only get into these difficulties if we agree to an ontology of facts. In the recent literature, facts were most strongly advocated by Armstrong (1997) , who thinks that they are needed as truthmakers. According to the Truthmaker Principle, every contingently true proposition must possess a truthmaker, which is an entity whose existence alone guarantees the truth of that proposition. To illustrate how this leads to facts, consider "The apple is red". The apple is not a truthmaker since it could have been green instead of red. Redness is not a truthmaker, either, since it could have been instantiated by a brick rather than the apple. Nor is the set containing the apple and redness a truthmaker since it could exist without the former instantiating the latter. To get a truthmaker, we need a way of joining properties and objects. This is where facts come into play: the fact that the apple is red cannot exist without both the apple and redness, and without the former instantiating the latter.
We can avoid Fine's problem if we are willing to reject the Truthmaker Principle and deny the existence of facts. Since that is a much bigger issue than I can discuss here, let me restrict myself to two quick remarks. First, giving up the Truthmaker Principle does not mean abandoning the view that contingent propositions are true in virtue of the way the world is. We merely need to spell out this view in a different way. Lewis (1992, p. 216) distinguishes two views about truthmaking: that truth depends on how entities are, and that truth depends on whether they are (which is what the Truthmaker Principle contends). Unlike the "whether" view, the "how" view of truthmaking is ontologically innocuous. In the case of the apple, we could simply say that the truth of "The apple is red" supervenes on how the apple is-namely red-and leave matters at that. There is no need to stipulate facts or any other objects as truthmakers. The "how" view of truthmaking would allow us to avoid commitment to facts, in which case Fine's circularity problem never arises. But doing so would also sever the connection between tensed theories of time and temporal propositions.
There is second point that is worth noting. The Truthmaker Principle requires all fundamental metaphysical theories to have exclusively ontological commitments. Until we have identified the truthmakers-objects whose existence alone guarantees all truths-we would not be finished with the business of metaphysics. Viewed from this perspective, tensed theories of the nature of time might appear incomplete. Thus Quentin Smith complains that Arthur Prior "never adequately clarified the positive ontological import of his tense operators" (1994, p. 11) . Somebody who already accepts tensed facts might of course reply that the function of tense operators is to pick out the facts. That this is what their "ontological import" consists in: tense operators are part of a complicated naming-scheme for tensed facts. But our question is whether a tensed theory of time requires a theory of temporal propositions and tensed facts, and not the other way around.
Suppose we decided to take tense logic at face value, and regard it as a theory of time. Such a theory would trade the ontological commitments of its rivals for larger ideological commitments, which include conceptually basic tense operators. On this view of time, tense operators simply do not have any ontological import. To demand an extensional theory with transparent ontological commitments that spells out the "deep truth" behind a such tensed theory of time would be to miss the whole point of the proposal. This also means that the adoption of a tensed theory of time would itself give us reason for rejecting the "what" view of truthmaking in favor of the "how" view. If we are serious about taking tense operators as conceptually primitive then the natural thing to say is that truth supervenes on how things were, are, and will be, and that this is all that can or needs to be said about this. Whether that is the right view about the nature of time is of course a different matter (Meyer 2013) , but the interesting point is that the relation between tensed theories of time and tensed facts is really one of mutual repulsion rather than one of irresistible attraction. Whatever reasons we might have for accepting a tensed theory of time are reasons for rejecting the Truthmaker Principle, which would then undercut the case for facts.
Conclusion
I not mean to suggest that tense logic and temporal propositions have nothing to do with one another. For one, we already noted that a theory of temporal proposition naturally assumes the form of a tensed theory. There is also an interesting connection that emerges within the project of tense logic itself. Suppose we decided to spell out all temporal distinctions in terms of conceptually primitive tense operators. Then we still need to say something about the nature of instants of time, which are the entities picked out by ordinary dates or the temporal coordinates used in physical theories. Regarding times as metaphysically basic entities would defeat the purpose of tense operators, so the only plausible option is to regard them as certain abstractions. Prior's (1967, chap. 5) proposal is that we identify instants of time with maximal propositions, which can only deliver more than one instant of time if these maximal propositions are temporal, and able to change their truth values. But there are also accounts that do without a commitment to propositions, by identifying times with maximal consistent sets of sentences (Meyer 2009) . So this does not undermine my thesis that the mere use of tense operators in linguistic or metaphysical theories does not commit us to any particular view about the temporal features of propositions.
